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CIRCUMSCRIPTION: PROUST'S THE CAPTIVE 
AND THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS 
CAROL DE DOBAY RIFELJ 
Middlebury College 
I like a look of Agony, 
Because I know it's true- 
Men do not sham Convulsion, 
Nor simulate, a Throe- 
The Eyes glaze once-and that is Death- 
Impossible to feign 
The Beads upon the Forehead 
By homely Anguish strung. 
Emily Dickinson, Complete Poems 
(ed. Thomas H. Johnson), 241 
There is no one but yourself who knows whether 
you are cowardly and cruel, or loyal and devout. 
Others do not see you, they guess at you by un- 
certain conjectures; they see not so much your 
nature as your art. Therefore do not cling to 
their judgment; cling to your own. 
Montaigne, Essays, III, 2 (tr. Donald M. Frame) 
The two quotations above present conflicting views on the 
problem of other minds. According to the first, other people's actions 
can be taken as evidence of their feelings; however much people may 
feign and simulate on other occasions, at some times-and it is 
interesting that those times should be instances of pain-we can know 
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what is going on in someone else's mind. Montaigne asserts, on the 
contrary, that we can never know; all we have are "uncertain conjec- 
tures." The questions raised by these quotations, such as "Do we ever 
really know what others are thinking and feeling?"or "How do we 
know?" lead to other, related questions: Can two people have the 
same pain? Do we know anything apart from our own mental expe- 
riences? What is the self? Can there be a private language? Such 
questions are not only of interest to philosophers; they also enter the 
realm of the novelist, and certain of them are especially relevant to the 
study of Proust. Just as the province of poetry seems to be that of the 
"inner world," so the province of the novel is that of interpersonal 
relationships.' Plots of novels involve characters seeking to discover, 
usually with at least partial success, what other characters really feel 
and think. Clearly at the core of Proust's The Captive is the attempt to 
explore "that unknowable thing which, when we seek to form a 
definite idea of it, another person's life invariably is to us."' It is not 
surprising that so many novels deal with a love situation, where the 
feelings of others (of one other) are of paramount importance. A 
happy ending, as in Pride and Prejudice or David Copperfield, often 
consists in one character finally revealing his or her love to another. 
And jealousy, as presented by Proust, is the situation in which 
characters are driven to doubts about their knowledge of the beloved's 
feelings. Both Swann (in Swann in Love) and Marcel find them- 
selves looking up from the street at the lighted window of their 
beloveds' rooms, an emblem of their sense of being shut out from their 
lives, which they can only deduce from a distance, from shadows. On 
the level of narration, the question of point of view or narrative 
perspective is that of the means of representing what characters 
perceive or think. On yet another level, Proust goes so far as to assert 
that only in art can we see something of the inner lives of others: art 
makes the ineffable .appear, "rendering externally visible in the 
colours of the spectrum the intimate composition of those worlds we 
call individual persons and which, without the aid of art, we should 
never know" (p. 348).3 
In Remembrance of Things Past, then, Proust not only comes to 
grips with the question of how to represent, as well as to form an idea 
of, another person's life, he also thematizes this problem in the course 
of the work. Nowhere is this clearer than in The Captive, whose 
subject is the narrator's attempt to delve into the character of Alber- 
tine, to circumscribe her. Ci).cumscribe comes from the Latin circum 
( around) + scribere (to write), and the OED gives several definitions 2
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of the term. It means, first, to draw a line around, to encompass, to 
encircle; second, to enclose within limits, to limit, bound, confine, and 
also to mark off, to define; third, to describe (a figure) "about another 
figure so as to touch it at certain points or parts without cutting it"; and 
finally, to write or inscribe around. All these meanings are relevant to 
The Captive. In order to define Albertine, Marcel must confine her: if 
he can set the boundaries to her life, he feels he can form it into a kind 
of circle or whole which would then be possible to grasp, to compre- 
hend. But to describe her, he must indeed make her into a kind of 
figure, a trope, not containing her, but merely standing for her life, 
incomprehensible because it stretches out "to all the points in space 
and time which the person has occupied and will occupy . . . . But we 
cannot touch all these points" (p. 128). The task he sets himself-as 
character and as narrator-raises the questions regarding the minds of 
others which have confronted modern philosophy, especially in the 
works of Wisdom, Austin, Wittgenstein, and Cavell. Proust presents 
Marcel's efforts as leading to failure, not only from an incapacity to 
satisfy his doubts about Albertine, but also because first, he wants 
more knowledge than he can get and a kind of knowledge which he can 
never have, and second, because there is a fundamental disparity 
between two irreconcilable views of the self, both of which he holds 
and on both of which he tries to act. This kind of acknowledgment of 
the contradictions inherent in the human condition is similar to that 
which Stanley Cavell finds in Wittgenstein's response to what Cavell 
calls the "threat" of skepticism, and which he characterizes as 
follows: "Skepticism meant to find the other, search others out with 
certainty: Instead it closes them out."4 
I 
In a New Yorker cartoon, a wife stands over a defeated-looking 
husband, saying, "You look sorry, you act sorry, you say you're sorry, 
but you're not sorry." This cartoon brings home the problem of other 
minds, for how are we to know what others are thinking and feeling, if 
not from how they look, how they act, and what they say? And this is 
the central problem in The Captive: the more Marcel tries to discover 
what is going on in Albertine's mind, the less he feels he knows and the 
more he is led to doubt whether one can ever know. As John Wisdom 
shows, from the statement "A never has that reason for a statement 
about how things seem to B that B has," that "It is tempting to infer 3
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that no one ever knows anything about the mind of another and even 
that no one ever has any right to assert anything about the mind of 
another."' The efforts of modern analytic philosophers have often 
been directed at driving a wedge between this premise and this conclu- 
sion. Austin, in "Other Minds," argues that under normal circum- 
stances, we of course accept the evidence of our eyes and ears, that if 
we doubt this evidence, there must be some reason: "Believing 
persons, accepting testimony, is the, or the main, point of talking" (p. 
82). Language then, what one says, is usually the best evidence we 
have of what a person thinks and feels. 
But Marcel, in The Captive, certainly does have reason to doubt, 
especially to doubt what Albertine says. A good part of the novel is 
taken up with Albertine's lies, their nature and their uncovering. 
Gilles Deleuze associates this deciphering of the beloved's lie with the 
search for truth which is Remembrance ofThings Past.' Yet the expe- 
rience of Albertine's lies is extremely painful to Marcel, for not only 
does it pain him to find she deceives him, but this discovery, instead of 
clarifying the situation, leads him into a tangle of deceptions he is 
increasingly unable to unravel and to the added pain of his own lies. 
Albertine forgets which stories she has told him, gets angry when she 
is found out, and retreats from a position only when she thinks he 
knows the truth already; and in these ways, she creates level upon 
level of deception. Even her admissions that she has deceived him are 
only another level of lying: " 'It is true,' she said, 'I was not having 
drawing lessons, I told you a great many lies at first, that I admit. But I 
never lie to you now' " (p. 240). Sometimes Marcel feels that 
deciphering Albertine's lies is a simple matter of reading her 
"writing" backwards; when she says she is not especially interested in 
going to the Verdurin's party, he reads the opposite message, that she 
is in fact eager to go. This kind of lying is like writing in his eyes 
because there is a one-to-one correspondence between the sign and its 
referent. But this relation is of course already figural, since the 
signifiers are turned, from their usual signifieds. So it is that the 
narrator finds that the lies leave blank spaces in Albertine's life which 
he would have had to fill in, to retrace, in order to understand her (p. 
125): language does not reveal, it blocks out. On another level, he 
finds that lies themselves may be evidence, a sign of something further 
hidden, but that that something is inaccessible: "the fact of the lie 
itself . . . in certain cases is self-evident. Not evidence of the truth that 
the lie conceals . . . the lie is immediately perceived, and our jealousy 
increased, since we are conscious of the lie, and cannot succeed in 4
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discovering the truth" (p. 237). Thus, it is not through the normal use 
of language that communication occurs, but rather through its disrup- 
tion, which engenders an ever-widening split in discourse. 
As Marcel's pursuits lead to more dissimulation on her part, they 
indirectly lead to his lies to her, trying to convince her of his indif- 
ference in order to bind her more closely to him. He too pretends to 
open his mind to her, while in reality, "My words, therefore, did not in 
the least reflect my sentiments" (p. 475). There seems to be no way 
out of this expanding, or rather, contracting, circle of lies; he finds 
himself in a world where nothing is sure, an existence "hagridden by 
people who have no real connection with us, full of lapses of memory, 
gaps, vain anxieties, our life as fantastic as a dream" (p. 194). When 
Albertine tells him that she has spent the afternoon with Bergotte, for 
instance, and he reads that Bergotte had died the day before, he 
assumes that the newspaper is mistaken in its dates: a different reality 
has been constituted for him. He expresses his despair at ever estab- 
lishing what is real and cries "To what end? To what end?" (p. 479). 
The Charlus sub-plot of the novel, and the theme of homosexuality in 
general, reinforce this idea of falseness, since the world of homo- 
sexuals presented here is one of necessary deceptions, both of society 
at large and of one another. 
In The Captive, then, we see the doubt and confusion that ensue 
when the normal functioning of language is undermined: Marcel is led 
to doubt by conflicting statements made by Albertine herself, by the 
conflict between what she says and what she does or what others say, 
and by his feeling that he has insufficient evidence (of whatever kind) 
about her. There are also disruptions within the message itself. Alber- 
tine's lies are associated with linguistic deformations and disruptions 
in syntax and stylistic level in particular. The first can be seen in the 
passage where the narrator likens her lying to the trope of anacolu- 
thon, a breaking-off and grammatical shift in mid-sentence. There is a 
similar break in her discourse toward the end of the novel, where she 
interrupts herself in the midst of uttering a vulgar expression, one 
which she would never have used with a man. In this second case, the 
rupture in syntax reflects a rupture in linguistic register; the expres- 
sion is used out of context. Albertine herself, when explaining (falla- 
ciously) why she avoids certain women, says it is not because of their 
lesbian way of life but because of the vulgarity of their speech. 
Further disruptions of communication ensue when the ways we 
have of discovering what another person thinks contradict each other. 
This is clear in the many instances where Albertine's facial expres- 5
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sions conflict with her speech, and it leads to a distrust of verbal 
language which Deleuze has characterized as "antilogos":7 
I had in the course of my life developed in the opposite direction 
to those races which make use of phonetic writing only after 
regarding the letters of the alphabet as a set of symbols; I, who for 
so many years had sought for the real life and thought of other 
people only in the direct statements with which they furnished me 
of their own free will, failing these had come to attach 
importance, on the contrary, only to the evidence that is not a 
rational and analytical expression of the truth; the words them- 
selves did not enlighten me unless they could be interpreted in the 
same way as a sudden rush of blood to the cheeks of a person who 
is embarrassed, or, what is even more telling, a sudden silence. 
Some subsidiary word . . . bursting into flames at the unintended, 
sometimes perilous contact of two ideas which the speaker has 
not expressed, but which, by applying the appropriate methods of 
analysis or electrolysis I was able to extract from it, told me more 
than a long speech. (p. 111) 
Albertine wishes to deny that she wants to leave him, but that message 
is transmitted despite her through signs which are both verbal and 
non-verbal, but in both cases involuntary. Her lies are uncovered, and 
"certain words, certain gestures" on some occasions reveal the truth. 
These other signs include: involuntary facial expressions (cf. the 
"rush of blood" above); facts relevant to the other's actions, like the 
presence of Mlle. Vinteuil at the Verdurin's party, which seems to 
explain Albertine's desire to attend it; and actions-like Albertine's 
returning from the Trocadero concert in obedience to his wishes. As 
the quotation above indicates, such signs often prove more accurate 
than direct verbal ones. This other language, that of the face, of 
gesture, and of inadvertent words, is truly figural. A facial expression 
or a word stands for another message, rather than being referential, 
i.e., denoting a thing or a state of affairs. Thus, all forms of language, 
rather than bringing us closer to what we seek, giving us the object, 
take us another step away. And even this gestural, facial language 
does not lead us to the truth; it forms a closed whole which is as non- 
referential as speech. Albertine's face often does not reveal what she 
thinks: "this immobility of even a light expression was as heavy as a 
silence; it would have been impossible to say that she blamed, that she 6
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approved, that she knew or did not know about these things. None of 
her features bore any relation to anything save another feature" (pp. 
477-78). Her face is a pure signifier, a syntagm with no paradigmatic 
axis, a syntax without a semantics. 
Marcel, as shown in the quotation above, is put in the impossible 
position of the interpreter, the decoder of these signs. It is as though he 
were analyzing Albertine's actions as a scientist would his materials, 
studying the "residue" left on her face by her emotions (p. 476), 
taking them as symptoms (pp. 456; 536). The prevalence of imagery 
of reading and interpretation in this novel result, as J. Hillis Miller has 
pointed out, from this conception of character as sign.' Where there is 
reading, of course, there is also misreading: not only does the narrator 
inform us directly of errors in interpretation which he has made (often 
including prolepses of the time when he is to be undeceived); in 
addition, he often uses a structure of analepses paralleling the 
prolepses, in which new information leads him to rectify earlier 
impressions or to fill in gaps in his knowledge. The Fugitive is in large 
measure a reprise of The Captive and earlier volumes, a re-reading 
of the same material (Albertine's life) from new perspectives. As 
Genette has pointed out, this analeptic structure is that of Remem- 
brance of Things Past as a whole.9 
The opacity of Albertine's character, constructed for the 
narrator through her lies, silences, and evasions, is created also for the 
reader by means of the narration of the novel. It has often been noted 
that Albertine is a mystery for the reader as well as for Marcel because 
we see her only from his point of view, and that the whether . . . 
whether and perhaps constructions imply that neither the narrator nor 
we can have more than a series of hypotheses regarding the motives of 
others.1° Indeed, the narrator admits it himself: "whether I was right to 
trust to that nature [his own feelings and motives] or on the contrary it 
did not corrupt Albertine's intentions instead of making them plain, 
that I find difficult to say" (p. 476). An exception to Albertine's 
silence, so to speak, is the intercalated note she writes to him when he 
has sent word that he would like her to return immediately from the 
Trocadero, to which he had earlier insisted that she go. That she will 
return (Francoise telephones him the news) seems to him proof that 
she belongs to him, but the note she writes and which gives him even 
more pleasure sounds patently insincere in its hyperbole and its 
protestations that nothing would be nicer than to rush home to him: 
thus, what seems to be written evidence of her attachment is rather a 7
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figure, replacing the real and opposite message, her falseness. Like 
irony or allegory, it is an invisible trope dependent on the receiver for 
its deciphering. Its intended receiver is unable to make it out. 
All these contraventions of communication lead Marcel to a 
Cartesian conception of a person as comprising two realms of 
existence, an inner and an outer being, the first of which is known only 
to him or herself. The vertiginous feeling he experiences at the con- 
templation of the "abyss" created by her lies and their destruction of 
the idea of a stable reality leads him to the skeptical position that a 
person's inner life (like his or her past life) is necessarily closed to 
others: in Albertine's eyes he senses "regions more inaccessible to me 
than the sky, in which Albertine's memories, unknown to me, lived 
and moved. . . . I felt that there yawned like a gulf the inexaustible 
expanse of the evenings when I had not known Albertine." He can 
touch her body, but "I felt that I was touching no more than the sealed 
envelope of a person who inwardly reached to infinity. How I suffered 
from that position to which we are reduced by the carelessness of 
nature which, when instituting the division of bodies, never thought of 
making possible the interpenetration of souls" (pp. 526-27). The 
body, then, is a substance radically different from the mind; and 
Albertine is not only "the captive" of Marcel; her soul, like 
everyone's, is caught (in Plato's image) in the prison-house of the 
body. In the quotation above, the image of an envelope recalls the 
descriptions of Albertine sleeping-a being "enclosed in a human 
body" (p. 128). The pleasure he takes in watching her sleep, 
mentioned often and described in somewhat disturbing detail, is not 
only that of the jealous man not wanting to reveal his desire, nor does it 
arise solely from the fact that she cannot prevent her features from 
revealing what she feels; it comes largely from the fact that while she 
sleeps, she is in a sense absent from herself." The imagery used to 
describe her is that of plants, statues, and dead women. Though the 
narrator says that "I had that impression of possessing her altogether, 
which I never had when she was awake," (p. 85; see also p. 501), it is 
rather that she possesses herself as little as he possesses her. 
These two philosophic stances with regard to the human mind, 
that it is separate from the body and that it is inaccessible to others, are 
interdependent, and they are both highly relevant to this novel: the 
prison of attentions and surveillance in which Marcel shuts Albertine 
turns out to be nothing compared to the one out of which she shuts 
him: his attempted intrusions into her mind are met with walls 
impossible to penetrate. 8
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II 
This skeptical position, though it is contradicted in a sense by 
Proust's views on art and by the very existence of the novel, is that 
with which analytic philosophy has tried to come to terms. Austin 
gives examples of times when we are mistaken about another's inner 
life (sometimes we are deceived; or we did not correctly interpret the 
signs given; or the signs were involuntary and did not accurately 
reflect the person's feelings), but he points out that we do have ways of 
dealing with these special cases (pp. 111-13). If we were not 
sometimes sure of the truth, we would not know what lying was. As 
Wittgenstein writes, "The word lying was taught to us in a particular 
way in which it was fastened to a certain behavior, to the use of certain 
expressions and certain circumstances."" Nevertheless, how can we 
deny that in any particular instance we may be wrong and therefore, 
that we can never by sure? Wisdom points out that skepticism is 
"superstition with the signs reversed": the superstitious person says 
"we can never know that there aren't fairies," and indeed, there seems 
to be no way to prove it incontrovertibly ("Other Minds VIII," p. 
205). From the deceptions he observes in others and from his 
mistakes in interpreting their words and actions, the narrator of The 
Captive draws the conclusion that others are radically inaccessible; 
he refers to them often as closed worlds, unsoundable abysses, or self- 
contained "beings." 
Yet just what is meant by such statements as "that unknowable 
thing . . . another person's life" or "We can never know what goes on 
in the minds of others"? As Wisdom points out, it is hard to know what 
the claim really is: if it is the normal sense of knowing at a given time 
that someone is, say, in pain, or thinking about philosophy, the state- 
ment is clearly false. As Wittgenstein writes, "If we are using the word 
`to know' as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then 
other people very often know when I am in pain."" If, on the other 
hand, it means that what is known as telepathy rarely (never) occurs, 
as Wisdom shows, then that seems true. But if it means that "we 
cannot know the mind of another in exactly the way he does himself," 
or "I cannot have his pain," it is necessarily true; it could not possibly 
be false (Wisdom, "Symposium: Other Minds," p. 220).14 Yet this is 
the point on which the skeptic concentrates: if I can't have his pain, 
how do I ever really know he has it? And it seems that this is just the 
kind of knowledge Marcel does want: The only true voyage of 
discovery, the only fountain of Eternal Youth, would be not to visit 9
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strange lands but to possess other eyes, to behold the universe through 
the eyes of another, of a hundred others, to behold the hundred uni- 
verses that each of them beholds, that each of them is" (pp. 348-49). It 
is not enough for him to know (in the sense of "to be right about") what 
Albertine is experiencing at any given moment; he wants to be certain, 
he wants always to be certain, and even more, he wants to have her 
experiences. 
The desire to assimilate Albertine to himself is expressed in 
terms of two interlocking strands of imagery that underlie the novel: 
imprisonment and possession. In a novel of this title it is hardly neces- 
sary to stress the images of prison, captivity, cages, bars, closed doors, 
enclosed spaces, and so on, that run through the work. It is, however, 
an imagery which grows in frequency and intensity: whereas at first, it 
seems just that Albertine is living with the narrator, his increasing and 
increasingly desperate surveillance of her makes it progressively 
clearer that she is his captive and at the same time renders inevitable 
her desire to leave and her eventual "escape." Indeed, according to 
the narrator, love itself depends on the fear of losing the beloved, who 
is a "fugitive" and thus a "captive woman" (p. 118). At the same 
time, he is aware of the reciprocal nature of imprisonment: "I was 
more of a master than I had supposed. More of a master, in other 
words more of a slave" (p. 207). It is he who is controlled by Alber- 
tine, for the more she eludes him, the more he finds himself obsessed 
with the desire to know about her. Her deceptions are like those of a 
slave or a captive, and they reinforce his sense of possession, but by 
means of them he is sealed out of her life. 
Deleuze shows that Marcel holds Albertine prisoner in order to 
explicate her, to empty her of her worlds (pp. 107-08). As such, he 
could know her and truly possess her. He is continually looking for 
signs in Albertine's behavior to indicate that she "belongs" to him. He 
buys her gifts of clothing and jewels because he wants to keep her 
happy in order to prevent her from leaving him, but also because when 
she wears the things he has bought, she is wearing the signs of his 
possession, and he has in a sense paid for her. He speaks of her 
repeatedly in terms of an objet d'art, something that can be collected; 
and the description of her own silver collection reinforces that image. 
It is while she sleeps, when she has lost her conscious identity and 
become like an object, that he experiences physical pleasure with her. 
Yet what he seeks to possess is not her body, but "that unknown life" 
which is hers (p. 227). It pleases him to think, upon returning home, 10
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 5
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol8/iss2/5
DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1141
Carol de Dobay Rtfelj 221 
that she will be there, that his home should be hers also; it is a 
"material symbol of my possession of her" (p. 233) and also an 
emblem of the union of conciousnesses he desires. When they walk 
together, their shadows blend into one, and their joined arms form a 
ring which "united our two persons in a single self" (p. 232). Like- 
wise, he feels that a double of Albertine exists within him (p. 341). At 
least, this is the state to which he aspires: if he were she, he could feel 
her pains, think her thoughts, and he would have attained that 
certainty which he lacks. But of course, he cannot possess her in this 
sense; he cannot both be her (the only true possession) and yet feel the 
joy of possessing her. He can keep her, but he cannot have her: even 
the actions of her body stretch out "to the infinity of all the points that 
it had occupied in space and time" (p. 491; see also p. 128). Further, 
as soon as she is his, she has lost the freedom, the very otherness 
which attracted him to her. In a kind of functioning of the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle, his efforts to pin her down in order to study her 
destroy the effect he wishes to examine. Only when he remembers her 
as free, as she was on the beach at Balbec, can he love her: as soon as 
he thinks of her as his captive, she becomes "possessed and of no great 
value" (p. 231); "because the sea breeze no longer buffeted her skirts, 
because above all, I had clipped her wings, she had ceased to be a 
Victory, was a burdensome slave of whom I would fain have been rid" 
(p. 507). What is valuable in her is what she has not given up to him. 
He is thus caught in a double bind: love is a desire to possess, and yet 
we love only what we cannot possess." 
The consequences of this paradox can be seen in the parallel 
endings to Cities of the Plain and The Captive, where Marcel's deci- 
sions to leave Albertine are reversed by the sense he has that she has 
escaped him. In the first volume, her statement that she has been an 
intimate of Mlle. Vinteuil (ironically, one of her lies) opens the 
possibility that she is a lesbian and therefore alien to him not only in 
her sexuality but also in the fact that she has another life of which he 
knows nothing. This precipitates the action of The Captive, in which 
he seeks to elucidate her past and present lives. Likewise, at the end of 
this volume she escapes his house before he can ask her to go, leading 
to his immediate desire to have her back and thus, to the action of The 
Fugitive. In this latter volume, her final escape in death ensures that 
she should become a permanent "fugitive" and therefore the beloved 
object of his years-long search into her past. 
Possession is presented as knowledge, and knowledge as lan- 11
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guage. In his desire to discover the many beings that make up 
Albertine, Marcel says: "I would have wished not to tear off her 
garments so as to see her body but through her body to see and read 
that memorandum block of her memories" (p. 119). The self is like a 
notebook, but one whose writing is accessible only to the owner. 
Marcel cannot read it: Albertine is like a text written in a language he 
does not understand, a code which, moreover, she keeps changing in 
order to elude his attempts to decipher it. 
"For there is no one who will willingly deliver up his soul" (p. 
198), writes the narrator in explaining Albertine's resistance to his 
curiosity, as though communicating were to turn oneself over to 
another, to give oneself up. Far from being a means of reaching the 
other, language serves to cut one off: contrasting music with speech, 
he imagines what interpersonal relations would have been like in a 
pre-lapsarian state "if there had not come the invention of language, 
the formation of words, the analysis of ideas" (p. 349). Imposing 
form, analyzing, these are the functions of naming: to name, to 
identify, is to cut off an entity from the rest of what exists, and thereby, 
from oneself. So not only can language serve to alienate when it is sub- 
verted through lies or through deformations; it is itself alienation. 
Yet there is another side to the view of language evinced in such 
quotations. Indeed, it is often language which serves philosophers as 
the means of refuting the skeptic's claim for the radical alterity of 
others. In the ordinary language philospher's appeal to what we say 
and "the search for our criteria on the basis of which we say what we 
say," Cavell sees "claims to community," and he expresses our deep 
need for such certainty in saying that "the wish and search for com- 
munity are the wish and search for reason" (p. 20). This side is 
presented in Proust as well, as discussed below; but also the novel 
itself is a "memorandum block," that is, the transmission of the inner 
life of another person, Marcel himself. And despite his sense of failure 
in his attempt, as character and as narrator, in The Captive he has 
attempted to do the same for Albertine. His failure is his success: if 
nothing else, he has succeeded in transmitting our sense of being cut 
of from others, and he has figured the untenable but ineluctable 
position expressed by Wisdom when he writes: "Does the contradic- 
tion in the philosopher's request for perfect knowledge of others 
reflect a conflict in the human heart which dreads and yet demands the 
otherness of others?" ("Symposium," p. 229). 12
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III 
There is yet another double bind which is articulated in this novel 
and which leads to the failure of Marcel's attempt to "capture" Alber- 
tine. It can be seen perhaps most clearly in the following passage: 
And, in themselves, what were Albertine and Andree? To learn 
the answer, I should have to immobilise you, to cease to live in 
that perpetual expectation, ending always in a different present- 
ment of you, I should have to cease to love you, in order to fix 
you, to cease to know your interminable and ever disconcerting 
arrival, oh girls, oh recurrent ray in the swirl wherein we throb 
with emotion upon seeing you reappear while barely recognising 
you, in the dizzy velocity of light. That velocity, we should 
perhaps remain unaware of it and everything would seem to us 
motionless, did not a sexual attraction set us in pursuit of you, 
drops of gold always different, and always passing our expecta- 
tion! On each occasion a girl so little resembles what she was the 
time before (shattering in fragments as soon as we catch sight of 
her the memory that we had retained of her and the desire that we 
were proposing to gratify), that the stability of nature which we 
ascribe to her is purely fictitious and a convenience of speech. 
(pp. 77-78) 
Here, the desire to immobilize, to fix Albertine or Andree (for how 
can he grasp them unless they hold still?) is stymied by their move- 
ment, their passage. Not only are they others-the other, to him- 
they are always other than they were, that is, others to themselves. 
The cliché, as alike as two drops of water, is transformed here into 
always dissimilar drops of gold. The self, then, is intangible in its 
multiplicity; it dissolves into a ray of light, it"shatters in fragments" at 
our touch. Moreover, it is shown to be both linguistic and fictional in 
nature. It is this conception of the self which makes Marcel's task in 
The Captive inherently impossible, even inconceivable: there is an 
aporia between the necessary positing of the self, without which we 
could not imagine interpersonal relations or even languages at all, and 
the narrator's vision of the self as fragmented, almost illusory, and 
itself linguistic, or more precisely, tropological. 
The exclamation "Alas! Albertine was several persons in one" 
(p. 463), conveys both her multiplicity and Marcel's sense of help- 13
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lessness in confronting it. Albertine is often described as a series of 
people. This multiplicity is both diachronic and synchronic (she has 
many past and future selves and there are many layers of her at any 
one time), both spatial and temporal; and it informs the narration of 
this volume: the more the narrator describes Albertine and her 
actions, the more the reader's impression of her becomes vague and 
fragmentary. The narrator returns again and again to his first impres- 
sion of her among her friends at Balbec (and it is likewise of course the 
reader's strongest impression of her) when she was still simple to him. 
That moment is fixed and two-dimensional in his memory. The 
attempt to seize a ray of light, however, does not lead to a clearer 
image of it, but rather to a sense of loss at its elusiveness. Further- 
more, part or parts of Albertine are entwined in the lives of other 
people; he speaks of her as "distributed among other people" (p. 483): 
his jealousy makes him try to prevent this seepage of her being into 
other lives; to confine her is to prevent parts of her from reaching his 
rivals. She is called "changeante," not only in the sense of being 
capricious but also elusive because she is constantly changing. She is 
repeatedly described as like this or like that (see especially p. 145); 
and the metaphors used to describe her convey the sense of her 
successive transformations, her metamorphoses from plant to flower 
to statue: 
Had I not detected in Albertine one of those girls beneath whose 
envelope of flesh more hidden persons are stirring, than in . . . I 
do not say a pack of cards still in its box, a cathedral or a theatre 
before we enter it, but the whole, vast, ever changing crowd? Not 
only all these persons, but the desire, the voluptuous memory, the 
desperate quest of all these persons. (p. 119) 
Each of these successive selves is shut up, in a box, an envelope, or an 
edifice, and is inaccessible to others. 
From the passage quoted at the beginning of this section, it 
appears that to speak about the self or a person at all is to speak meta- 
phorically: it is a question of mere convenience. We give a name to the 
succession of selves that make up a person, and the act of naming is a 
purely arbitrary notation, an abstraction, a fiction. The proper name, 
often conceived of as pure reference and the very model of denota- 
tion, turns out to be metaphorical, or more precisely, what Fontanier 
would classify as a metaphorical catachresis, because it is "forced," 
i.e. there is no other word we could use.'6 As Marcel discovers at the 14
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death of Swann, when a person dies and the name's denotation 
disappears, only "a mere name, a written name" remains. This name 
itself loses its shape and distinctiveness (that is, its power to distin- 
guish) through time, becoming "formless" (pp. 269-70). Indeed, the 
names of the characters in this novel themselves blend into one 
another: Odette/Oriane; Albertine/Andree; Charles Swann/Charlie 
Morel/M. de Charlus; Gilbert de Guermantes/Gilberte Swann. This 
blending can be seen most clearly in The Fugitive when Marcel takes 
Gilberte's signature on a telegram for the dead Albertine's, the G 
resembling an A, the arabesques at the end turning into an -Me ending: 
what we usually take as the authentication of a person's identity, her 
signature, her mark, fails to indicate the correct person." 
It is not only Albertine who is presented as successive or mul- 
tiple in the course of this and other volumes of the Remembrance of 
Things Past: in The Past Recaptured, for example, the narrator finds 
that "there were, however, two M. de Charluses, not to mention any 
others" (p. 125), and he is aware of his own lack of unity: "We realize 
our own nature only in the course of time" (The Captive, p. 517). 
Deleuze links this multiplicity of the self with the moment when the 
sleeper wakes and chooses among the possible places and times and 
selves which present themselves to him (p. 114; see also the opening 
pages of Combray). This view of the self echoes Hume's argument 
that the self or the soul is a fiction. He says that when he looks within 
himself for such an entity as the self, all he finds is a series of percep- 
tions: 
Our last resource is to .. . boldly assert that these different related 
objects are in effect the same, however interrupted and variable. 
In order to justify to ourselves this absurdity, we often feign some 
new and unintelligible principle, that connects the objects 
together, and prevents their interruption or variation. Thus we 
feign the continued existence of the perceptions or our senses, to 
remove the interruption; and run into the notion of a soul, and 
self and substance, to disguise the variation." 
Further, in Proust, the self is constituted, in yet another paradox, 
through that which has been shown to be altogether inaccessible, the 
other: through the other's language and through the unending 
mirroring of ourselves in the other. This position prefigures that of 
Lacan, according to whom the I is formed through the image of the 
child and others at his or her side reflected in a mirror: "We have only 15
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to understand the mirror stage as an identification in the full sense 
that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes 
place in the subject when he assumes an image."' 9 The ego so formed 
is for Lacan, as for Proust, a fiction: "But the important point is that 
this form situates the agency of the ego, before its social determina- 
tion, in a fictional direction" (p. 2). It is not just in order to know 
Albertine's feelings in general that Marcel sequesters her: he wants to 
know how she feels about him, what he is in her eyes, questions that 
are resumed in the doubt about whether or not she wants to leave him 
( a question which is tantamount to asking whether their lives are 
irremediably separate). The question of The Captive, then, is what he 
is for her, and therefore, what he is. It is a question which must remain 
unanswered, for Albertine cannot give him what he can only find 
within himself." Because of this impossibility, Leo Bersani finds that 
Albertine makes Marcel suffer in preventing him from using her to 
"objectify a stable image of himself" (p. 50). It is in The Captive that 
Marcel is named for the first time, and it is via Albertine that he is 
named, in a passage so unreadable that it calls into question the entire 
status of the narration of the novel: "she said: `My-' or 'My 
dearest-' followed by my Christian name, which if we give the 
narrator the same name as the author of this book, would be 'My 
Marcel' or 'My dearest Marcel' " (p. 91). Albertine's love for him, 
expressed in her words, make his naming possible. It is inevitable and 
ironical that these words may well have been lying ones. In a parallel 
form of lying, the narrator admits that the self he ascribes to Albertine 
is one he has invented, and invented in words: "a romance which I had 
spent millions of minutes in writing" (p. 497). In the passage about 
Albertine and Andree he makes it clear that it is our imagination 
which accepts characterizations of other people and that these 
characterizations are taken "at their word"; it must be so, for they are 
words. 
Through this calling into question of the concept of the self, 
Proust also undermines what Miller has identified as an assumption 
underlying the European novel: that each character has a self, a kind 
of center to which we can pin qualities and feelings. Instead of 
revealing to the reader the thoughts of the characters, Proust's 
narrator admits that he simply does not know them, and the reader 
never discovers what Albertine's feelings for him, the reader, really 
are. He goes even further when he admits that he has not accurately 
represented what he does know, that his account is itself fictitious: 
"Yes, I have been forced to whittle down the facts, and to be a liar, 16
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but it is not one universe, there are millions, almost as many as the 
number of human eyes and brains in existence, that awake every 
morning" (p. 255). The tension created by the narrator's presenta- 
tion of characters as they are usually conceived and our awareness of 
them as allegorical projections of himself are what Leo Bersani sees as 
the point of the novel (pp. 246-47). Marcel is not only Albertine's 
reader, he is also self-consciously her author. So it is that in a sense 
Marcel does circumscribe Albertine: he describes a figure about what 
is already figure, Albertine's "self." But instead of being contained 
within that circle, she eludes him, as ever, in an unending spiral of 
figuration. Her leaving him at the end of the volume is a figure of this 
figuring. 
IV 
But what language do I speak? What is my language? Am I 
talking French? Yes, it must be French. But what is French? I can 
call it French if I want, and nobody can say it isn't-I'm the only 
one who speaks it. What am I saying? Do I understand what I'm 
saying? Do I? Ionesco, Rhinoceros (tr. Derek Prouse) 
It is not only Albertine whom the narrator writes: he also writes 
himself. Indeed, the novel has often been characterized has the story 
of his becoming a writer; and his discovery of the continuity of his self 
through time in The Past Recaptured is simultaneous with his affirma- 
tion of his faith in literature -"letters." Proust has often been taken as 
claiming that the self is constituted through memory (cf. Bersani, p. 
214); whereas it has been pointed out repeatedly since Locke's 
exposition of this theory that the concept of memory is itself 
dependent upon the concept of the self. Nonetheless, Proust does not 
seem to make a claim that runs counter to the point made by Hume in 
refuting Locke, that "memory does not so much produce as discover 
personal identity" (Hume, p. 34). It is language which makes memory 
possible, as Proust asserts when explaining Albertine's tendency to 
get her stories confused when she lies: "we remember the truth 
because it has a name, is rooted in the past, but a makeshift lie is 
quickly forgotten" (p. 190). Such a connection between language, 
memory, and the self depends on a kind of Wittgensteinian view of the 
publicity of language. Wittgenstein puts into question the idea of a 
private language, pointing out that one could never be sure that a sign 17
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in one's language referred to the same thing today as yesterday; there 
could be no "criterion of correctness": "Always get rid of the private 
object in this way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do 
not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you" 
(Investigations, p. 207, § 258). It is this possibility and this threat 
which is recognized by Berenger, the last man on Earth, in the passage 
from Rhinoceros quoted above: the impossibility of understanding 
and responding to others that Cavell calls the "fantasy of a private 
language" leads to the impossibility of understanding oneself. 
Conceiving of others as inaccessible closed circles imprisons the 
skeptic within himself as much as it seals off others; and it leads not to 
a search for and in others, but to their rejection: "skepticism and 
tragedy conclude with the condition of human separation, with a 
discovering that I am I; . . . the alternative to my acknowledgement of 
the other is not my ignorance of him but my avoidance of him, call it 
my denial of him" (Cavell, Claim of Reason, p. 389). In the face of his 
own belief in the inaccessibility of others, the narrator is able to affirm 
the possibility of such acknowledgment, not only through art, but also 
through love: 
And I became aware that Albertine was not even for me the 
marvellous captive with whom I had thought to enrich my home 
(for if her body was in the power of mine, her mind escaped from 
the grasp of mine) ... urging me with a cruel and fruitless pressure 
to the remembrance of the past, she resembled, if anything, a 
mighty goddess of Time. And if it was necessary that I should 
lose for her sake years, my fortune-and provided that I can say 
to myself, which is by no means certain, alas, that she herself lost 
nothing-I have nothing to regret. [Through the very pain she has 
caused him, she has] given me access beyond my own 
boundaries, upon that avenue which, private though it be, 
debouches upon the high road along which passes what we learn 
to know only from the day on which it has made us suffer, the life 
of other people. (pp. 527-28) 
He has been opened up to Albertine, though it is through a wound, and 
escaped the prison of his own selfhood. So it is that he cannot be a 
collector, pursuing or seeking to possess works of art or people; he 
sees, too, that Albertine cannot be his captive. And it thus becomes 
possible for him to find the road out of the self and the reaching out to 
others which is literature. 18
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It is important, however, not to see such a passage as a resolu- 
tion of the problems raised in The Captive: there can be no reconcilia- 
tion between the conflicting views expressed by Proust on the radical 
alterity of the other and this possibility of union; of the self as a 
graspable entity and the self as fragmented and figural; of language as 
preventing communication and language as constituting the self and 
making communication possible. In maintaining these contradic- 
tions, Proust approaches the position of Wittgenstein as Cavell reads 
him, writing at another level from the philosophers who, since 
Descartes, seek knowledge as absolute certainty and who tend to deny 
the problem of skepticism and the threat to reason it represents by 
claiming that it does not exist or that it makes no sense. Proust, too, is 
writing in the face of the aporias inherent in his views of the self and 
the other: it is these impossibilities of which he writes. 
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